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1 Introduction
The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) refers to a bilateral EU-US
free trade agreement that was under consideration during the Obama administration. The
purpose was to remove bilateral tariffs and non-tariff barriers on bilateral exports of goods
and services2. The Trump administration has put the pursuit of TTIP on hold, however.
The question that can than be raised by economists is what gains in terms of production
and employment are foregone by not concluding TTIP both for the US and for each of the
EU-28 countries? To address this question, this paper first develops a novel network trade
model with global value chain linkages. The model is then used to predict the effects of the
TTIP free trade agreement between the US and the EU. Using existing parameter values
from the literature we simulate the trade model using sector-level input-output data.
Production processes are increasingly fragmented across national boundaries. The emer-
gence of global production networks implies that one can no longer consider bilateral trade
in isolation when evaluating trade policy or idiosyncratic shocks (Johnson, 2014; Acemoglu
et al., 2012). A full assessment of trade shocks requires new models that consider global
value chain linkages and trade costs worldwide. A traditional gravity model would not
take these international production linkages into account and typically only consider the
direct shipments between bilateral trade partners. In this paper, we develop and explicitly
solve a network trade model that includes global value chain linkages and overcomes the
limitations of a traditional gravity approach. We derive closed-form solutions to allow for
comparative statics on changes in trade costs. The model can thus be used for any kind of
policy experiment that involves a reduction in trade costs between trade partners such as
TTIP.
To illustrate that our network trade model is better suited than traditional gravity models,
consider a reduction of bilateral EU-US tariffs on steel and cars after TTIP. When
evaluating the impact of such tariff changes on Belgian steel production, a traditional
gravity approach would only consider the direct impact of reduced US tariffs on Belgian
2TTIP also involved opening up government procurement and facilitating bilateral investment but in
this paper we only consider the trade aspect.
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steel exports to the US. Belgian steel production is also indirectly affected by TTIP,
however, as it is used as an input in other domestic and foreign sectors. Indeed, lower
US import tariffs on Belgian and German cars increase the US demand for EU cars which
raises the intermediate demand for Belgian steel and hence its production. Similarly,
US steel production is directly affected by EU tariffs on US steel, as well as indirectly
affected by EU tariffs on US cars. Finally, part of the indirect impact of TTIP is due to
re-exports, whenever EU steel is embedded in US exports to the EU, or vice versa. A
traditional gravity approach would overlook the different types of indirect effects of TTIP
on a sector’s production. Therefore, the total gains of free trade agreements such as TTIP
are incorrectly measured through a traditional gravity approach. The reason is that a
sector’s production is not only affected by its own tariff change but also by tariff changes
in other sectors, whenever there are inter-sectoral production linkages.
We find these indirect effects to be important, particularly in the more upstream sectors.
For instance, 74% of the total impact of a deep TTIP on the Belgian steel sector is due to
the indirect channels3. The reason is that the steel sector supplies to many other Belgian
and EU sectors, which are also affected by TTIP. The indirect impact is smaller in sectors
that produce more downstream (final) goods like cars, since these sectors supply less inputs
to other sectors, but rather export most of their output directly to the final destination.
For the German car industry, for instance, we find that only 8% of the gains of the TTIP
tariff reductions in trading with the US would be indirect. This implies that its direct
exports to the US create almost all the benefits of TTIP for the German car sector4. This
corresponds to the idea that the more upstream and the more central in the supply chain,
the larger the indirect production effects of a sector. On average, we find the indirect effects
(via other domestic and foreign sectors) of a deep TTIP to amount to 72% of the total
TTIP impact for the EU-28 countries, compared to 60% for the US. This suggests that
production networks in the EU are more closely integrated than in the US. It also suggests
that a gravity model at sector-level that does not account for these indirect effects, would
3For the US (German) steel sector the indirect effects account for 72% (68%) of the total TTIP impact.
4For the Belgian and US automotive industry, the indirect effects amount to 26% and 24% of the total
impact, respectively.
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seriously bias the effects of TTIP in terms of sector-level production and jobs. In this
paper we include both direct and indirect effects, to overcome some of the shortcomings of
a traditional gravity approach and the resulting measurement bias.
The model that we develop is probably closest to the one by Noguera [2012] which features
indirect exports in a value added setting. While Noguera [2012] considers aggregate trade
flows at the country-level, we instead develop a model with both final and intermediate
trade flows at the more disaggregate sector-level. This has a number of important
advantages. First, trade tariffs vary substantially across sectors, which means that a failure
to account for this heterogeneity across sectors may lead to biased results. Second, as
intra-industry trade between countries is substantial, it is important to allow two distinct
countries to be active in the same sector producing similar goods. Third, our model allows
for differences in the trade elasticity across sectors, meaning that consumers (and firms) can
react differently to price changes in different sectors. Fourth, it exploits the availability
of sector-level data such as the World Input-Ouput Database (WIOD), which allows us
to include services in the analysis. This is important given that services are increasingly
traded as well as embedded in the exports of goods. Disregarding services would therefore
miss an important share of global trade. Finally, as the production linkages between
two countries typically differ greatly across sectors, our sectoral approach yields a more
precise assessment of the indirect effects of a trade shock and hence of the production and
employment effects of tariff changes.
Our theoretical framework features a Cobb-Douglas-CES nest in production as well as
in consumption. On the production side, firms produce output with a Cobb-Douglas
technology and fixed expenditure shares on labor and a composite intermediate good,
taking goods and factor prices as given. The composite intermediate good is a Cobb-
Douglas combination of intermediate goods from all sectors. Each of these sector-specific
intermediate goods is a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) aggregate across all the
countries the input can be purchased from.
On the consumption side, final consumers derive utility from an aggregate final good, which
is a Cobb-Douglas combination of final goods from different sectors. Every sector-specific
final good is a CES aggregate across all countries the good can be purchased from. The
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CES nests on the production and the consumption side rely on the Armington assumption,
which means that goods produced by different sources are imperfect substitutes simply
because of their origin. The way producers and consumers substitute between goods from
different countries within a given sector is directly related to the sector’s trade elasticity.
The Armington assumption closely mimics the input-output data that shows that in reality
similar inputs (from the same sector) are purchased from different countries. This is
different from a Ricardian approach where every input is sourced from only one particular
country, as in Dhingra et al. [2015] and Caliendo et al. [2015]. How much is sourced from
each country depends on relative prices, which is a function of the productive efficiency of
the supplier and trade costs. Finally, in our analysis we focus on the value-added share in
a country-sector’s production and the employment associated with it.
The database that we use is the World Input-Output Database (WIOD)5, as in Johnson and
Noguera [2012], Foster-McGregor and Stehrer [2013], Timmer et al. [2014], Timmer et al.
[2015] and others that have investigated inter-sector and international linkages in global
value chains. WIOD has a worldwide coverage that allows for the study of production
networks covering all countries. Another advantage of using WIOD is that all upstream and
downstream sectors can be identified for any sector in the production network, allowing for
the construction of input-output linkages. The WIOD database provides the main variables
required for our analysis of the impact of a trade shock, i.e. trade flows, value added shares
and production input-output linkages. We complement this data with estimates of sector-
level trade elasticities and employment elasticities that we obtain from the literature.
The novelty of our approach is that we consider all the downstream production and
employment effects that stem from a change in domestic value added following a trade
shock such as the TTIP free trade agreement. Our approach differs from several studies
such as David et al. [2013] who assess US employment effects of Chinese import penetration
at the regional level but do not consider the input-output linkages between industries.
5We use the 2016 release of the World-Input-Output Database (WIOD). This sector-level database
provides information about the origin and destination of intermediate and final goods and services in 56
sectors using ISIC Rev.4 for 43 countries between the years 2000 and 2014. Dietzenbacher et al. [2013]
describes in great detail the procedure that was followed to construct these World Input-Output Tables.
5
Other studies are aimed more at identifying the welfare gains and losses from trade policy
but focus less on inter-sectoral linkages and intermediates (see Costinot and Rodriguez-
Clare, 2013 for an overview). Other papers using input-output data in the context of trade
policy have a different focus. Blanchard et al. [2016] show that countries which are more
connected in global value chains have lower tariff protection between them. Feenstra and
Sasahara [2017] study the impact of U.S. imports from China and U.S. exports to the world
on U.S. employment, based on global input-output tables. Dhingra et al. [2017] evaluate
Brexit on UK household income levels and Caliendo et al. [2015] assess the welfare effects
of NAFTA. Finally, several studies in trade have now shown that gross trade flows do
not necessarily reflect the domestic production underlying the trade flow (Koopman et al.,
2014; Bernard et al., 20176), which is why we use value added flows instead.
We consider both a “shallow” and “deep” TTIP scenario, which differ by the extent of
trade liberalization between the EU-28 and the US. Under a “shallow TTIP”, we assume
import tariff to be completely removed. Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs), which include customs
procedures, different regulations and product standards, remain at their current level.
Under a deep TTIP, we assume that all tariffs are removed and NTBs are reduced, resulting
in greater overall trade cost reductions than under a shallow TTIP7. Since both scenarios
only differ in the reduction of NTBs, the additional gains from a deep TTIP compared to
a shallow TTIP are due completely to the NTB reduction. This allows us to compare the
relative importance of NTB versus tariff reductions for the production and employment
gains from TTIP.
Our predictions indicate that the EU as a whole stands to gain relatively more than the
US, both under a shallow and deep TTIP scenario. For the EU we find an increase in value
added production as a percentage of GDP of 0.26% under a shallow TTIP and up to 1.30%
under a deep TTIP. This corresponds to EU job gains of 234 000 jobs for a shallow and
6Bernard et al. [2017] use firm-level data to show gross export sales can be much larger than domestic
production. This micro-level evidence suggests that at the aggregate country-level gross exports can be
very different from domestic production.
7We limit ourselves to the trade aspect of TTIP, which means we do not consider Foreign Direct
Investment (FDI) responses or public procurement responses to larger US-EU trade openness. Our approach
is static, i.e. we disregard any dynamic effects of TTIP related to innovation, capital mobility and migration.
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over 1 million jobs for a deep TTIP. The gains in value added and jobs differ substantially
across all EU-28 member states. The countries that, in relative terms, stand to gain most
from TTIP are Ireland, Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands. The potential gains for
the US, on the other hand, are relatively lower. A shallow (deep) TTIP would increase US
GDP by 0.11% (0.79%) and US employment by 49 000 jobs (350 000 jobs). The largest
share of the deep TTIP gains arise from the reduction of NTBs. The main reason is that
tariffs are already historically low and only apply to goods, while NTBs are still relatively
high and apply to both goods and services sectors.
The TTIP impact varies across countries due to differences in sectoral composition. As
shown by Acemoglu et al. [2012], it is the network centrality of sectors that determines
the impact of an aggregate shock through a “cascade effect” in the input-output network.
In the TTIP scenarios, we consider different tariff and NTB reductions across sectors,
and the propagation of these tariff shocks differs depending on the sectoral composition
of the economy considered. A sector that only has a few production linkages with other
sectors may not affect aggregate output much even when it faces large drops in trade
costs, as opposed to a sector that is very central in the production network. This idea
was formalized by Rasmussen [1956]’s forward and backward linkages (see also Miller and
Blair, 2009). Our results take this network centrality and the sectoral production linkages
into account when estimating the gains in value added and jobs as a result of TTIP.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we develop the theoretical
model. In Section 3, we describe the data and methodology used. Section 4 presents the
results of our policy experiment, in the form of production and employment gains that
could arise from TTIP. Section 5 concludes.
2 An Input-Output Model of Trade
In the model below we use superscripts to denote the country-sector of origin and subscripts
to denote the country-sector of destination, e.g. the quantity of intermediate steel from
Belgium shipped to the German car industry is denoted by XBE,steelDE,car . In general, countries
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are denoted by i, j and k and sectors by r, s and z8. Demand for labor by country k’s
sector z for example is captured by Lkz. Throughout this section, upper-case symbols refer
to real quantities, whereas lower-case symbols denote their nominal counterparts.
The model is based on the Armington assumption, which means that goods produced by
different sources are imperfect substitutes. As a result, within a sector, goods from different
countries can coexist in the same destination market, even though their prices may differ
as they are determined by the country-sector’s marginal production cost and costs of trade
with the destination country9. Consumers (and firms) in the destination country have a
love-for-variety and prefer to consume positive amounts of each available variety.
2.1 Consumer Demand
The representative consumer in country k derives utility from consuming quantities of an
aggregate final good Fk:
Uk = Fk =
S∏
s=1
[
F sk
]αsk
(1)
which is a Cobb-Douglas combination of quantities F sk consumed of final goods from all
sectors s ∈ S, with αsk the corresponding share in total expenditures. This sector-specific
final good is a CES aggregate across all countries the good can be purchased from,
F sk =
[
N∑
i=1
(
F isk
)σs−1
σs
] σs
σs−1
(2)
where σs > 1 is the elasticity of substitution (for final goods) within sector s between the
countries of origin i ∈ N10.
8We need at least three symbols in the model to denote countries and sectors because input-output
models typically consider three nodes in a supply chain: (1) the supplier of intermediate inputs, (2) the
final producer and (3) the consumer.
9As in Noguera [2012], production and trade costs are the only determinants of prices in our model.
This does not imply that firms cannot charge markups. In WIOD, however, we have no information on the
underlying firm-level distribution within each sector. The absence of markups in the model is assumed at
sectoral level.
10For simplicity, we assume this sector-specific elasticity of substitution to be the same across all countries
k.
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2.2 Producers
In country k’s sector z, output Y kz is produced according to a Cobb-Douglas technology
combining labor Lkz and intermediate inputs Xkz11:
Y kz = (Lkz)1−β
kz(Xkz)β
kz (3)
where βkz represents the share of intermediate expenditures in total sales of country
k’s sector z. The intermediate goods composite Xkz is a Cobb-Douglas combination of
intermediate goods from all sectors s ∈ S, Xskz:
Xkz =
S∏
s=1
[
Xskz
]γskz
(4)
where Xskz denotes the real aggregate demand of intermediates from sector s by country k’s
sector z, and γskz is the corresponding share in total expenditures on inputs. The sector-
specific intermediate good Xskz is a CES aggregate across all countries the input can be
purchased from:
Xskz =
[
N∑
i=1
(
Xiskz
) ρs−1
ρs
] ρs
ρs−1
(5)
where ρs > 1 is the elasticity of substitution (for intermediate goods) between the countries
of origin within sector s12. Note that this nested Cobb-Douglas-CES structure is similar
to that of the consumer demand aggregates.
2.3 Utility and Profit Maximization
Let wkz denote the price of labor in country k’s sector z (Lkz) and pkz the price of output
from kz (Y kz). Given iceberg-type trade barriers, in order to satisfy country j’s demand
of one unit of kz, kz needs to produce τkzj units, with τkzj > 1. The price of one unit of
11Following several standard trade models, we only account for labor as a factor of production. This
assumption can be relaxed, for instance by accounting for high-and low skilled labor.
12For simplicity, we assume this sector-specific elasticity of substitution to be the same across all countries
k.
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kz’s output in destination j then equals pkzj = τkzj pkz accounting for differences in trade
costs across destinations j. Note that we typically assume there are no barriers to trade
within a country, i.e. τkzk = 1.
Firms maximize profits by choosing Lkz and Xiskz and households maximize utility choosing
F isk subject to their budget which equals Ik =
∑S
z=1wkzLkz, i.e. their income from
supplying labor Lkz to each sector z in country k. Firms and households take factor price
wkz and goods prices τkzj pkz as given. This results in the optimal nominal counterparts
of real demand (which are denoted by a lower-case symbol and that are obtained by
multiplying real demand by the corresponding price). Nominal output of kz is represented
by ykz ≡ pkzY kz. The CES price index in country k of final goods from sector s equals
P sk =
[∑N
i=1
(
pisk
)1−σs] 11−σs . The price of the aggregate intermediate input Xkz is given
by the Cobb-Douglas price index PIkz =
∏S
s=1(P sk )γ
s
kz where P sk is the CES price index in
country k for intermediate goods from sector s which we assume, for tractability, to be the
same as the corresponding price index for final goods (this implies that σs = ρs and that
the price of a certain good from sector s is the same whether it is sold as an intermediate or
a final good13. The (FOB) price14 of output from kz equals pkz = ( wkz1−βkz )
1−βkz(PIkz
βkz
)βkz .
The optimal nominal demands then equal:
lkz ≡ wkzLkz = (1− βkz)ykz
xkz ≡ PIkzXkz = βkzykz
xskz ≡ P skXskz = γskzβkzykz
xiskz ≡ pisk Xiskz = τ isk pisXiskz = (
τ isk p
is
P sk
)1−σsγskzβkzykz (6)
f isk ≡ pisk F isk = τ isk pisF isk = (
τ isk p
is
P sk
)1−σsαsk
S∑
z=1
(1− βkz)ykz (7)
13The assumption that firms and consumers share the same price elasticities allows us to substantially
simplify the analysis, as in Noguera [2012].
14The assumption of perfect pass-through inherent to this theoretical framework is a limiting assumption
since pass-through depends on firm size with larger firms having lower pass-through rates (Amiti et al.
[2014]). However, in the WIOD data we have no information on the underlying firm size distribution within
a sector.
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2.4 Market Clearing
Let ekzj ≡ fkzj +
∑S
s=1 x
kz
js denote the nominal gross exports from country-sector kz to (the
consumer and producers in) country j. Market clearing requires
ykz =
N∑
j=1
ekzj (8)
Following the same logic as in Anderson and Van Wincoop [2003], we derive gravity
equations for final and intermediate goods exports, but now at the sector-level. Denote
world nominal output by yw and country-sector kz’s share in world output by θkz ≡ ykz/yw.
Substituting Equations (6) and (7) into Equation (8) allows to solve for prices pis.
Substituting these into the price index P sk and plugging the resulting expression for P sk into
(6) and (7) results in the following gravity equations for intermediate and final bilateral
exports and equilibrium price indices:
xkzjs =
ykzγzjsβ
jsyjs
yw
(
τkzj
ΠkzP zj
)1−σz (9)
fkzj =
ykzαzj
∑S
s=1(1− βjs)yjs
yw
(
τkzj
ΠkzP zj
)1−σz (10)
P zj =
[
N∑
k=1
θkz(
τkzj
Πkz )
1−σz
] 1
1−σz
Πkz =
 N∑
j=1
φzj (
τkzj
P zj
)1−σz
 11−σz
where φzj =
∑S
s=1 θ
js(γzjsβjs + αzj (1 − βjs)) is a measure of the importance of goods from
sector z for producers and consumers in country j. It takes into account (i) the dependence
of producers in all sectors s in country j on intermediates from sector z through θjsγzjsβjs
and (ii) the importance of goods from sector z in the final demand by households in country
j (through αzj ) and the total income these households earn in all sectors s in j (through
θjs(1− βjs)).
Equation (9) relates bilateral intermediate trade between firms in country-sector kz and
country-sector js to (i) the economic masses of source and destination relative to the world,
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(ii) the importance of inputs in the destination’s production (βjs) and the importance of
sector z goods within these inputs (γzjs), (iii) the bilateral trade costs between countries k
and j in sector z (τkzj ), and (iv) outward and inward multilateral resistance terms (Πkz and
P zj ). Similarly, Equation (10) relates bilateral final goods trade between firms in country-
sector kz and the consumers in country j to (i) the economic masses of source (ykz) and
destination (∑Ss=1(1− βjs)yjs)15 relative to the economic mass of the world (yw), (ii) the
importance of sector z final goods in the destination’s consumption (αzj ), (iii) the bilateral
trade costs between countries k and j in sector z (τkzj ), and (iv) outward and inward
multilateral resistance terms (Πkz and P zj ).
2.5 Input-Output Production Linkages
Dividing both sides of Equation (9) by yjs we obtain the technical coefficient akzjs or ”dollar’s
worth of inputs from kz per dollar’s worth of output of js”:
xkzjs
yjs
≡ akzjs =
ykzγzjsβ
js
yw
(
τkzj
ΠkzP zj
)1−σz (11)
Plugging the technical coefficients into the market clearing in condition in (8), we have
ykz =
N∑
j=1
(
S∑
s=1
xkzjs + fkzj )
=
N∑
j=1
S∑
s=1
akzjsy
js +
N∑
j=1
fkzj
which can be summarized for all countries and sectors as
Y = AY +
N∑
j=1
fj (12)
15This expression reflects the fact that consumers in country j get their income from supplying labor to
all sectors s.
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where
Y =

y1,1
y1,2
...
yN,S
 ; A =

a1,11,1 a
1,1
1,2 a
1,1
1,3 . . . a
1,1
N,S
a1,21,1 a
1,2
1,2 a
1,2
1,3 . . . a
1,2
N,S
...
...
... . . .
...
aN,S1,1 a
N,S
1,2 a
N,S
1,3 . . . a
N,S
N,S
 ; fj =

f1,1j
f1,2j
...
fN,Sj

where fj is the (S ∗N) x 1 vector of country j’s final demands and A the (S∗N) x (S∗N)
global bilateral input-output matrix at the sectoral level. The system in Equation (12) can
be written as
(I−A)Y =
N∑
j=1
fj (13)
with I the (S∗N) x (S∗N) identity matrix. If (I− A) can be inverted, we can find the
solution for nominal output as
Y = (I−A)−1
N∑
j=1
fj = L
N∑
j=1
fj (14)
where L is known as the Leontief inverse matrix. Each element Lkzis of L is the Leontief
coefficient that measures the total of dollars worth of country-sector kz goods required to
meet 1 dollar worth of is’ final demand. This value combines kz goods used as inputs in
is directly as well as kz goods used as inputs in other industries which then also produce
inputs for is. Using this, we can obtain country k’s nominal output in sector z as
ykz =
N∑
i=1
S∑
s=1
Lkzis
N∑
j=1
f isj (15)
=
N∑
i=1
S∑
s=1
Lkzis
N∑
j=1
(
yisαsj
∑S
r=1(1− βjr)yjr
yw
(
τ isj
ΠisP sj
)1−σs
)
where we substituted the gravity relation from Equation (10) for the final value f isj flowing
from country-sector is to the consumer in country j. Finally, we can transform this into
value added production. For this purpose, we assume that the value added share of a
country-sector’s production is the part that is generated by its labor. Looking back at the
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production function in (3), the value created by country-sector kz after accounting for the
intermediates used is captured by the share of labor 1 − βkz. Hence, following Noguera
[2012] we find the value added embodied in kz’s nominal production ykz as (1 − βkz)ykz
where 1− βkz ≡ vkz is the value added to output ratio. The total value added production
by kz can thus be written as
vakz = vkz
N∑
i=1
S∑
s=1
Lkzis
N∑
j=1
f isj (16)
This value added production (and the jobs depending on it) might be severely impacted in
the case of a trade shock, which is the subject of the next section.
2.6 Creation of a Free Trade Agreement
In this section, we examine the impact of the creation of a free trade agreement on a
country-sector’s value added production. We know that an import tariff imposed on a
specific good will not only affect the producer of the good, but also the suppliers of goods
and services whose output is used as an input in the production of the good. This implies
that when the US agrees to lower its import tariff on, say, German cars, the Belgian
steel sector which supplies inputs to the German car industry will also be affected, even
if the US tariff on Belgian steel does not change. This channel is missing in a traditional
gravity approach but is captured by our methodology. The impact of a trade shock can
be examined by considering what would happen when the variable trade costs (τ) change.
Our interest lies in the change dvakz in country-sector kz’s value added production, which
we find to equal
dvakz = −vkz
N∑
i=1
S∑
s=1
(σs − 1)Lkzis
N∑
j=1
τˆ isj
{
f isj +
S∑
r=1
xisjr
}
= −vkz
N∑
i=1
S∑
s=1
(σs − 1)Lkzis
N∑
j=1
τˆ isj e
is
j (17)
from which we can derive the following general result. Rising trade costs reduce bilateral
trade flows eisj between any country-sector is and j. As kz has an interest Lkzis in each of
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these bilateral flows, vakz will decrease as well. The drop depends on the magnitude of the
change in relative trade costs τˆ isj between is and j and the corresponding trade elasticity
σs.
In Equation (17), we defined τˆ isj ≡
dτ isj
τ isj
− dΠisΠis −
dP sj
P sj
as the proportionate change in tariffs
τ isj relative to the proportionate changes in the multilateral resistance (MR) terms. When
examining trade policy, it is important to take into account that the multilateral resistance
(MR) terms will change along with the tariffs. Therefore, Equation (17) not only examines
the impact of dτ
is
j
τ isj
but also that of dΠisΠis and
dP sj
P sj
. As it is relative tariffs that matter
rather than absolute tariffs to determine a country’s global competitiveness, individual
tariff changes should be compared with changes in the average tariff, which is captured
by the multilateral resistance terms. Suppose, for instance, that the US tariff on Belgian
goods goes down with 3% after TTIP. However, if the US reduces its tariffs on all its other
trading partners with 3% as well, the Belgian products did not become cheaper in relative
terms. What matters is the tariff change a producer faces relative to the tariff change its
competitors face.
After TTIP, the only countries that are likely to face reduced costs of trading with the
US are the EU-2816, whereas the tariffs the US imposes on its other trading partners such
as Canada will not change. This means that Canadian goods will become relatively more
expensive for the US, even though the US tariffs on Canadian imports do not change. The
reason is that TTIP actually increases (i.e. τˆCA,sUS > 0) the “relative” CA-US trade costs
compared to EU-US trade costs. As a result, some trade will be diverted from the CA-US
to the EU28-US. The MR changes dΠisΠis and
dP sj
P sj
are essential for trade diversion to happen.
We can see this by disentangling the change τˆ isj into its different components, namely the
16For simplicity, we still consider the UK as a member of the EU in this analysis. A hard Brexit, however,
is likely to have an impact on the effects of TTIP, as the UK is an important trade partner of the US.
Since the outcome of the Brexit trade talks is still uncertain, we abstain from making any predictions and
continue to consider the UK as an EU member with access to the European Single Market.
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tariff change and the MR changes:
dvakz = − vkz
N∑
i=1
S∑
s=1
(σs − 1)Lkzis
N∑
j=1
dτ isj
τ isj
eisj︸ ︷︷ ︸
trade creation effect
+ vkz
N∑
i=1
S∑
s=1
(σs − 1)Lkzis
N∑
j=1
[
dΠis
Πis +
dP sj
P sj
]
eisj︸ ︷︷ ︸
trade diversion effect
(18)
Equation (18) shows that the change in kz’s value added production after a change in trade
costs τ is a combination of a “trade creation effect” (+) as a result of lower tariffs and a
“trade diversion effect” (-) caused by the change in the multilateral resistance terms. The
results can be summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1: The change in kz’s value added production after a trade shock depends
on two effects. First, the positive “trade creation effect” indicates that the gain in vakz
depends on kz’s connection with each exporting country-sector is. The rise in vakz will
be greater, (i) the higher is the trade elasticity in sector s (higher (σs − 1)); (ii) the
greater is the decrease in protection imposed by j on sector s goods originating in country
i (higher negative change dτ
is
j
τ isj
); (iii) the greater is the production interlinkage of kz with
is (higher Lkzis ) and (iv) the stronger is the direct bilateral trade relation in both final and
intermediate goods between i and j in sector s (higher eisj ). Second, these positive effects
will be mitigated through the “trade diversion” channel, as some of kz’s production was
used in exports that are diverted away from after the trade shock.
Equation (18) characterizes all the different channels through which a trade shock can
affect a sector’s output vakz. It is clear that the impact of a trade shock such as TTIP on
a given sector can be very different depending on a number of determinants that vary by
sector. Strong production interlinkages (high L) with a large exporting sector (high e) do
not necessarily lead to large production gains (through the “trade creation effect”) in case
this sector produces highly differentiated goods (making it insensitive to price changes, i.e.
σ is low) or experiences only minor tariff decreases (small dττ ). Accounting for this sectoral
heterogeneity gives a more accurate picture of the potential impact of trade policy.
The focus of our analysis lies in the production and employment effects of a trade shock
such as the formation of TTIP. Our framework is less well equipped to answer questions
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about welfare or productivity gains from trade liberalization. Our sector-level approach
does not account for firm-level heterogeneity within sectors. Given that we do not have
information on the underlying firm-size distribution per sector, our framework does not
allow us to observe reallocation effects following trade liberalization. Melitz [2003] showed
that trade liberalization reallocates market shares from less to more productive firms,
resulting in average and aggregate productivity gains. Moreover, the heterogeneous firm
literature provides evidence of an endogenous response of within-firm productivity to
trade liberalization. Trefler [2004] examines the rise in labor productivity of Canadian
manufacturing after the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement and finds an industry-level
increase of 5.8% in labor productivity due to the FTA and a 7.4% increase at the plant-level.
Both the reallocation productivity gains and the within-firm productivity improvements
are absent from our framework. Our primary focus lies in production network linkages
at the sector-level. Since we have no information on sector-level productivity gains, our
results are ceteris paribus, i.e. holding productivity constant, and are therefore likely to
underestimate the full impact of the TTIP trade agreement.
In the next section, we apply our framework to the specific TTIP trade shock. We compute
the possible production effects of the US-EU trade deal, in which both parties lower their
bilateral trade costs such as tariffs and Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs)17.
3 Data and Methodology
This section takes the model to the data and simulates the effects of different scenarios
of TTIP using input-output data from WIOD. The starting point is Equation (18), which
computes kz’s potential value added gains dvakz as a combination of a trade creation
and diversion effect, where the latter derives from the changes in multilateral resistance
17Our analysis only captures the static effects of a trade shock and it does not include dynamic effects
such as access to foreign markets, firm investment and innovation, capital mobility and migration. In
terms of the time horizon, we assume all effects to occur immediately after the TTIP agreement is signed.
However, it should be noted that it can take some time for our simulated outcomes to arise. Especially
non-tariff barriers (NTBs) can have a lagged effect.
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(MR) terms. These MR terms are not observable, and not controlling for them in gravity
estimation is what Baldwin and Taglioni [2006] call “the gold medal of classic gravity
model mistakes”. Empirically, there are several ways to deal with the issue of MR, see for
instance Anderson and Van Wincoop [2003], Baier and Bergstrand [2009] and Novy [2013].
Hummels [1999] and Feenstra [2015] suggest to control for MR using directional (exporter
and importer) fixed effects in a gravity model based on past data series. However, in
our analysis of the cost of a non-TTIP, where we simulate the model to engage in future
predictions, the inclusion of fixed effects is not an option. The empirical findings in the
literature on the magnitude of the trade diversion effect of import tariffs are ambiguous
but seem to suggest that trade diversion effects tend to be small18. In order to divert trade,
new business contacts have to be established, new contracts negotiated and so on, which
takes some time to materialize. In our assessment of TTIP, we therefore concentrate on
the short-run effects and restrict Equation (18) to the first term that measures the “trade
creation effect”. This is the first-order trade effect, which captures the main effects of the
TTIP’s tariff changes19. The increase in country-sector kz’s value added production as a
18There appears to be no consensus in the literature on the magnitude of trade diversion effects. Dai
et al. [2014] use manufacturing trade data for 64 countries and find that Free Trade Agreements (FTAs)
divert trade, particularly on the import-side. However, Magee [2008] using different gravity specifications
estimates of the trade diversion effects of regional agreements to be small and their significance to depend
on the specification used. Similarly, Soloaga and Wintersb [2001] found evidence of export diversion in a
minority of FTAs i.e. only 2 out of 9 FTAs analyzed had substantial trade diversion. Dhingra et al. [2017]
estimates the potential gains by non-EU countries arising from the reduced trade between the EU-27 and
the UK. The non-EU gains turn out to be very small, approximately between 0.01 and 0.02% of GDP.
Therefore, the mitigation effects of trade diversion are likely to be small.
19Not accounting for trade diversion further implies that our framework does not capture so-called
“beggar-thy-neighbor”-effects. This refers to the effects of trade policy on domestic production at the
expense of foreign production imported from the trading partners. In this sense, the case of non-TTIP may
hold some benefits for domestic producers as their output would be higher under non-TTIP than in the
event of TTIP when some domestic production is substituted by foreign output.
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result of reduced costs of trade between the US and the EU will thus be approximated by
dvakz ≈ − vkz
∑
i∈EU
S∑
s=1
(σs − 1)dτ
EU,s
US
τEU,sUS
Lkzis e
is
US︸ ︷︷ ︸
EU-US trade creation effect
− vkz
S∑
s=1
(σs − 1)dτ
US,s
EU
τUS,sEU
LkzUS,s
∑
j∈EU
eUS,sj︸ ︷︷ ︸
US-EU trade creation effect
(19)
Equation (19) reveals that kz’s value added production will go up as a result of increased
EU-US as well as US-EU trade. Lower trade costs boost transatlantic flows in both
directions, and the impact on kz’s production is therefore twofold. The data needed to
calibrate Equation (19) to obtain the value added production gains are discussed in the
next section.
3.1 Value Added Production Gains
In order to obtain an estimate of the value added gains, Equation (19) indicates that five
key variables are needed. The five determinants in this equation are retrieved from various
sources: (i) the value added to output share vkz, the Leontief coefficient Lkzis and the direct
trade flows eisUK are variables from WIOD; (ii) the trade elasticities at sector-level σs are
borrowed from the literature and (iii) the change in trade barriers τ is derived from two
potential TTIP scenarios. The job gains that correspond with the gains in value added from
TTIP are obtained from Eurostat (OECD) data on EU-28 (US) sector-level employment,
using sectoral employment elasticities from the literature.
3.1.1 Input-Output Data
The World Input-Output Database (WIOD) contains detailed information on the global
value chains of 44 world countries and 56 sectors20. The latest available year is 2014, which
we use in our analysis.
For each country-sector, WIOD provides its total production, the inputs it needs from
other country-sectors and how much of its output is used by other country-sectors in their
20Alternatively, other databases used in the literature are the ”Global Trade Analysis Project Database”,
”OECD Input-Output Tables” or the ”WTO-OECD TiVA Database.
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production process. The first variable that we obtain from WIOD is the value added
share of country-sector kz’s production, vkz. This captures the value added, obtained as
gross output minus gross intermediate inputs, per unit of gross output. We also obtain
the Leontief coefficients, Lkzis from WIOD, which are obtained using Equation (14). In
addition, again from WIOD we obtain the direct trade flows eisj from country is to country
j, which are obtained by summing exports from is that are destined to country j to satisfy
its final and intermediate demand.
3.1.2 Trade Elasticities
Changes in value added at the sector-level further depend on a sector-level trade elasticity.
A trade elasticity measures the proportionate increase in demand after a 1% decrease in
trade costs. In terms of TTIP, it captures the idea that lower US tariffs and Non-Tariff
Barriers (NTBs) will decrease the price of EU products in the US (and vice versa), which
will boost US consumers’ demand of EU goods. In the model, this is captured by the
elasticity of substitution σs in sector s, from which the trade elasticity is derived as σs− 1.
The literature has shown that trade elasticities typically vary both across countries and
sectors. For example, Imbs and Me´jean [2017] use product-level gross export flows between
1995-2004 to estimate trade elasticities, based on a multi-sector model developed by
Arkolakis et al. [2012] and Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare [2013]. They confirm that there is
considerable heterogeneity in trade elasticities across countries and sectors. Using aggregate
data, they find that the average trade elasticity within the EU countries is -2.98 with
a minimum of -2.11 for Germany and a maximum of -4.83 for Greece21. Using more
disaggregated data, they find that, within countries, trade elasticities also vary across
products and consequently across sectors. Using their estimates, we find that Germany
has an average elasticity across 11 manufacturing sectors of -5.1, with a median of -4.7
21For more information, see Table 4 in Imbs and Me´jean [2017].
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and maximum and minimum of -11.1 and -3.2, respectively22. In order to allow for the
heterogeneity across sectors that is present in the theoretical framework, we use the average
trade elasticies across countries at a sectoral level given that Imbs and Me´jean [2017] do not
report estimates of trade elasticities for every EU country-sector. In this way, we obtain
elasticities for 16 different manufacturing sectors. For the remaining sectors we assign a
trade elasticity of −4 which is a lower-end estimate of the trade elasticities reported in
earlier literature. However, given that we analyze trade in value added rather than gross
flows and that our data are at sector-level and not at product-level, we prefer to use the
lower-end estimate of the trade elasticity. Therefore, the simulation results that we obtain
can be regarded as lower bound estimates23. We assume complete pass-through of tariffs
into domestic prices (congruent with the model). While our results depend on the choice
of the trade elasticity, what has to be kept in mind is that our results vary linearly with the
trade elasticity i.e. doubling the trade elasticity in every sector, doubles the value added
gains from TTIP. Hence, results depend monotonically on the trade elasticity parameter.
3.1.3 Potential TTIP Scenarios
The gains in value added from Equation (19) hinge on the decrease in trade barriers. We
consider two TTIP scenarios, namely a “shallow” and a “deep” Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership, referring to different reductions in the tariffs and NTBs on trade
between the EU and the US.
The current level of tariffs between both trading partners are the Most Favored Nations
(MFN) tariffs at product-level, according to World Trade Organization (WTO) rules. For
both the EU and the US as a reporting country, we compute the unweighted average
22In our analysis, we use a sectoral aggregation at 2 digit in Nace Rev. 2. For this reason, we use
the Reference and Management of Nomenclatures tables (RAMON) provided by Eurostat to find the
correspondence of the estimates provided by Imbs and Me´jean [2017] who use ISIC3 as their product
classification.
23Other trade elasticities estimates in the literature confirm this heterogeneity. Baier and Bergstrand
[2001] use trade data to estimate a demand elasticity of -6.43, while Broda et al. [2006] use ten-digit HS
data to obtain price elasticities of around -12. A recent paper by Cos¸ar et al. [2016] uses a trade elasticity
of -5.66. Ossa [2015] estimates sector level trade elasticities which range between -1.54 and -25.05.
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applied MFN tariff across products within each sector (as classified in WIOD). The
tariff per sector for EU goods trade to the US and vice versa are shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Average MFN tariff imposed by EU and US
Note: Information on the current tariffs applied are collected using the WTO Integrated Data Base (IDB). This
database contains information on the applied tariffs at the standard codes of the Harmonized System (HS) for all
the WTO Members. In this exercise, we use the Reference and Management of Nomenclatures (RAMON)
correspondence tables to classify the equivalent Combined Nomenclature (CN) to the respective CPA 2008 code.
The current level of NTBs are obtained from Berden et al. [2009], which gives the tariff
equivalent of the current non-tariff barriers to trade between the EU and the US and vice
versa for a subset of sectors. These barriers include “border measures” (such as customs
procedures) and “behind-the-border measures” that result from domestic regulations and
standards. Part of these regulatory differences between trade partners are driven by
language, geography and culture and refer to frictions that cannot be eliminated. Even
in the extreme case that the US and the EU negotiate a very deep TTIP agreement that
eliminates all existing barriers to trade, part of these NTBs (around 50% according to
Berden et al., 2009) will remain. We follow Berden et al. [2009] in designing our scenarios
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and allow only for reductions in NTBs that are feasible. The reducible share in NTBs
differs across sectors and depends on the direction of the trade flow (US-EU or EU-US
trade), which we also account for.
Using the information on tariffs and NTBs, we design two types of the transatlantic trade
agreement. Under a “shallow TTIP”, we assume negotiations to affect only the level of
the tariff by completely removing them, while NTBs remain at their current level. A deep
TTIP is assumed to remove all tariffs and reduce the NTBs by the full reducible part
(Berden et al., 2009). Note that since both scenarios only differ in the reduction of NTBs,
the additional gains from a deep TTIP compared to a shallow TTIP should be attributed
completely to the NTB reduction. This allows us to get an idea of the relative importance
of the NTB and tariff reductions for the production and employment gains from TTIP.
Table 1 summarizes the shallow and deep TTIP scenarios.
Table 1: Remaining trade costs under TTIP
shallow TTIP deep TTIP
Tariffs 0% 0%
Non-tariff barriers current level maximally reduced
Note: Information on NTBs is obtained from Berden et al. [2009].
3.2 Employment Gains
Based on Equation (19), we use the data discussed above to obtain the total value added
production increase dvakz in country k’s sector z. To arrive at employment effects, we need
an employment elasticity. This elasticity measures the proportionate rise in employment
after a 1% increase in value added production. In theory, Hamermesh [1986] argued that
a production function characterized by constant returns to scale (as in our framework)
features an elasticity of 1. However, this differs from empirical evidence. Konings and
Murphy [2006] use European firm level data and report employment elasticities with
respect to value added for manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors below 1. They
find the range of average employment elasticities between 0.57 and 0.72 in manufacturing
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sectors and 0.33 in non-manufacturing sectors. We use the lower bound of these sectoral
estimates to obtain the effect of TTIP on EU and US employment. This implies that
for every 1% increase in domestically produced value added, we assume employment to
go up by 0.57% in manufacturing and 0.33% in non-manufacturing sectors. Similar to
the trade elasticities, the TTIP results on employment depend linearly on the choice of
the employment elasticity. Thus, once we have obtained the relative rise in employment
from the increase in production, we can compute the absolute number of jobs gained by
multiplying by the country-sector’s total employment base24.
4 Results
4.1 The Cost of non-TTIP
We present and discuss the results on the gains of TTIP (or the cost of non-TTIP) in this
section. The effects of the formation of a free trade agreement are assumed to materialize
immediately, i.e. we do not consider any transition period. As such, our results are the
outcome of a static analysis. As explained before, we account for two different scenarios:
(i) a shallow TTIP that removes all tariffs that currently apply to EU-US trade and (ii) a
deep TTIP that additionally eliminates NTBs to the extent that is possible. We present
both value added production and employment effects in the two scenarios for all countries
involved (EU-28 and the US). The results are summarized in Tables 2 and 3. It has to be
kept in mind that our analysis has been entirely carried out at the sectoral level, whereas
in the tables we have aggregated results at the country-level.
For value added, the results can be found in Table 2. For a shallow TTIP, we find modest
economic gains. A shallow TTIP would increase EU GDP25 by 0.26%, which is significantly
more than the 0.11% increase in US GDP. There is strong heterogeneity within the EU-28,
however. The country that stands to gain most from a shallow TTIP is Ireland (0.62%
24Throughout the analysis, we assume that any job lost in the US is not going to move to the EU-28
and vice versa.
25GDP or Total Value Added (TVA) for each country is obtained using the WIOD database.
24
increase in GDP), whereas for countries like Cyprus and Greece there is not so much at
stake (0.03-0.04% gain in GDP).
Similar conclusions can be drawn for the deep TTIP scenario in Table 2. The potential gain
of a deep TTIP for the aggregate EU-28 (1.30% of GDP) is again higher than for the US
(0.79%). Within the European Union, the potential value added gains vary significantly
by country. Ireland experiences considerable gains (3.75% increase in GDP), followed by
Germany (1.82%), Belgium (1.57%) and the Netherlands (1.57%).
Table 3 summarizes the employment results for both TTIP scenarios. A shallow TTIP
creates 234 000 jobs in the EU (0.11% of total EU employment) and 49 000 jobs in the
US (0.04% of total). In relative terms, the job gains are highest for Italy with 0.20%
employment increase (corresponding to 44 500 jobs). A deep TTIP potentially creates
more than 1 million EU jobs, increasing total employment by 0.49%. In the US, job gains
are ca. 350 000 jobs or 0.30%. Ireland would now be the largest beneficiary with more than
a 1% increase in employment (20 000 jobs), potentially explained by the large impact the
elimination of NTBs under a deep TTIP would have on the services-oriented Irish economy.
4.2 Heterogeneity Across Sectors
There are large differences in the impact of TTIP between the different sectors. This
section investigates the sector-level heterogeneity and its causes.
Table 4 lists the sector that stands to gain most from a deep TTIP in each country. Sectors
can differ depending on whether we express gains in terms of value added or employment.
The reason is that the value added contribution per worker differs across sectors. The same
increase in value added can lead to different employment effects in different sectors. For
example, in terms of value added the German “Motor Vehicles” sector gains most from a
deep TTIP, while in terms of employment it is “Machinery & Equipment”. For the EU-28 as
a whole, a deep TTIP increases both production and employment most in the “Machinery
& Equipment” industry. In the US, the sectors that gain most are “Chemicals” (in value
added terms) and Administrative & Support activities (in terms of employment).
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The sector-level heterogeneity in terms of TTIP impact depends heavily on the magnitude
of the tariff change, but also the sector-level trade elasticity as well as the network centrality
of the sector. The current average MFN tariffs per sector for EU goods trade to the US and
vice versa were shown in Figure 1 before. In the event of a TTIP we assume these tariffs
to reduce to zero in every sector, which for some sectors such as Textiles involves a large
tariff reduction, while for other sectors such as Paper products involves only a small tariff
change. Clearly, the larger the tariff reduction, the stronger the increase in production that
the model predicts (see Equation (19)), depending also on the sector-level trade elasticities
which are reported in Table 5 along with the employment elasticity.
Another important determinant of the sectoral heterogeneity in the TTIP impact is
the network centrality of a sector within the input-output production network. This is
illustrated in Table 6, where we contrast the indirect production effects of a deep TTIP
for an upstream sector like steel (basic metals) with the indirect impact for a downstream
sector like cars (motor vehicles). For each country, the indirect impact is expressed as a
percentage of the total impact and measures the share of the country-sector’s total value
added production gain from a deep TTIP that is due to an increase in exports of other
domestic or foreign sectors once the trade agreement is signed. For most of the countries
involved, the upstream sector steel displays much larger indirect production effects from
TTIP than the downstream car sector. The reason is that steel is used as an input in many
other sectors, therefore in the case of TTIP it is not just the tariff change in steel that
affects steel production but also tariff changes in other sectors. On the other hand, the
indirect effects are small in the car sector, suggesting that most of the production effects
in this sector are due to the change in tariffs on cars induced by TTIP.
To improve understanding of the relative importance of the indirect impact of a trade
agreement, Figure 2 below displays the shares of direct and indirect impact of a deep
TTIP for a number of sectors in Germany and the US. The sole purpose of selecting these
sectors is to illustrate the difference in direct versus indirect impact of TTIP between
more downstream and more upstream sectors. The first six sectors on the left of Figure 2
are downstream sectors that produce final goods which are closer to the consumer, such
as motor vehicles, furniture, textiles and food. For these downstream sectors, the direct
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impact (represented by the dark bar) clearly constitutes the lion’s share of the impact of
deep TTIP, as explained in the steel and car example. The last four sectors at the right
end of Figure 2 can be regarded as more upstream sectors whose output is used as an input
in the production process of other industries, which is the case for basic metals and mining
for instance. We clearly see that for those upstream sectors, the impact of a deep TTIP is
largely indirect, as around 70% of the value added production gain is due to an increase
in exports of other domestic or foreign sectors after the trade agreement. Finally, the
difference between Germany and the US appears to be quite small in most sectors, which
confirms the idea that there is more heterogeneity across sectors than across countries in
terms of the importance of the indirect network effects in the total impact of a free trade
agreement.
Figure 2 suggests that a network approach like ours is especially relevant to capture the
indirect effects that are mainly situated in the upstream sectors. In upstream sectors, a
gravity approach would only consider direct trade flows at sector-level to a final destination
and would thus miss out a lot of the production effects in the case of a free trade agreement.
Our network approach aims to overcome this limitation by also considering the production
and employment effects in a sector that result from its indirect linkages to other sectors.
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Figure 2: Share of direct and indirect impact of deep TTIP on German and US sectors
Note: the indirect impact in a country-sector is computed as the share of the value added production gain that is
due to an increase in exports of other domestic or foreign sectors after a deep TTIP agreement. The direct impact
is the share of the value added production gain that is due to the sector’s own increased exports.
4.3 Importance of Tariffs and NTB Reduction
This section briefly discusses the importance of the different types of liberalization under
TTIP, by investigating which type of trade barrier matters more in TTIP, namely tariffs or
Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs). In other words, do tariff reductions or NTB reductions cause
the largest TTIP gains? To answer this question, we can simply look at the difference
between the shallow and the deep TTIP gains. Our shallow TTIP scenario is defined as
an agreement to completely eliminate tariffs while leaving NTBs unchanged. Under deep
TTIP, we assume tariffs are completely eliminated, and in addition NTBs are reduced. As
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a result, the additional gains under a deep TTIP compared to a shallow TTIP are caused
by the reduction in NTBs.
This NTB reduction turns out to be the most important determinant of the deep TTIP
gains. Based on the estimates of the gains under a shallow and deep TTIP in Table 2,
we can assess the relative importance of tariff reductions versus NTB reductions. For an
individual EU country like Germany, we find that tariff reductions account for 22% of the
TTIP gains, while NTB reductions account for the remaining 78%26. For the EU as a
whole, tariff reductions account for 20% of TTIP gains, while NTB reductions account for
the remaining 80%. For the US, tariff liberalization accounts for 13% and NTB reductions
account for 87% of the TTIP gains. These numbers clearly indicate that NTB liberalization
is much more important in the case of TTIP and this is true for every trade partner involved
in TTIP as well as every sector.
The first reason as to why the NTB reduction generates most of the gains from TTIP
is that, currently, the tariff equivalent of the Non-Tariff Barriers to transatlantic trade is
significantly higher than the prevailing MFN tariffs (see Berden et al., 2009). Another
reason is that NTBs apply both to goods and services, whereas tariffs are only imposed on
goods trade, which increases the importance of reducing NTBs compared to tariffs.
26The total value added gain under a shallow TTIP is 14.7 billion dollars for Germany, while the gain
amounts to 65.7 billion dollars under a deep TTIP. The effects that are due to the tariff reductions can
thus be computed as 14.7/65.7 = 0.22. The remaining 78% (1− 0.22) is caused by the NTB reduction.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper we develop and explicitly solve a trade model with worldwide sector-level
input-output linkages in production. The model allows us to separately identify all the
channels through which tariff changes operate. This results in a new network trade model
that overcomes the limitations of a traditional gravity approach and that derives closed
form solutions which allow for comparative statics on tariff changes.
A traditional gravity model is often used to estimate the effects of tariff changes on trade
flows which are then used to infer changes in the sector’s production. We argue here
that this approach does not account for production changes that arise from input-output
linkages. Tariff changes in other sectors also need to be taken into account whenever a
sector’s output is used as inputs by other domestic and foreign sectors. This is especially
relevant when a sector is well-connected in the network and its inputs are used by many
other sectors. Including these indirect production effects in the analysis results in more
accurate estimates of a free trade agreement which typically involves lower tariffs in many
sectors. Hence, an important insight from our analysis is that indirect production effects
are stronger whenever a sector is more upstream. The measurement bias arising from
traditional gravity analysis to assess the economic gains from bilateral free trade agreements
such as TTIP is therefore larger whenever a sector is higher up in the value chain and
supplies to many other sectors.
Using World Input Output Data (WIOD), we simulate our model both under a shallow
TTIP that removes all tariffs that currently apply to EU-US trade, and a deep TTIP, that
additionally eliminates all removable non-tariff barriers. We find that TTIP can boost
bilateral trade between the EU and US, as well as increase production and employment
in all trade partners. Our sector-level input-ouput approach indicates that the EU-28 as
a whole stands to gain relatively more from TTIP than the US, both in the case of a
shallow and deep TTIP. One of the main reasons for this difference in gains is the more
closely integrated EU-28 production network both across sectors and countries. Another
important finding that arises from our analysis is that the largest share of TTIP gains
come from the reduction of Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs) as opposed to tariff reductions.
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We find strong heterogeneity in TTIP gains across EU member states. The EU country
that stands to gain most from TTIP is Ireland, followed by Germany, Belgium and the
Netherlands. This heterogeneity derives from the sectoral composition of these economies
and on the centrality of their key sectors in the EU production network. This confirms
Acemoglu et al. [2012], who find it is the sector’s network centrality that determines the
impact of an aggregate shock through a ”cascade effect” in the input-output network. A
sector that faces large tariff reductions may not have strong aggregate effects if it is not well
connected to other sectors, whereas a sector facing small tariff changes can have a large
aggregate impact if it is central in the economy and supplies to many other sectors. Hence
from a macro point of view, this granular approach to free trade agreements is important.
Our analysis is one of the first to take the network centrality and the input-output sectoral
linkages into account when predicting the potential gains in production and employment
of a free trade agreement such as TTIP.
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Tables
Table 2: Total gain in Value Added from TTIP
Country
Shallow TTIP Deep TTIP
(million $) (% of total VA) (million $) (% of total VA)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
AUT 1 184 0.29% 5 463 1.35%
BEL 1 225 0.24% 7 883 1.57%
BGR 83 0.16% 387 0.74%
CYP 7 0.03% 52 0.24%
CZE 556 0.28% 2 522 1.27%
DEU 14 683 0.41% 65 649 1.82%
DNK 639 0.20% 3 432 1.09%
ESP 1 795 0.14% 8 649 0.67%
EST 35 0.14% 191 0.77%
FIN 487 0.20% 2 903 1.17%
FRA 4 439 0.17% 23 880 0.90%
GBR 5 446 0.19% 33 435 1.20%
GRC 86 0.04% 529 0.25%
HRV 88 0.17% 417 0.82%
HUN 415 0.33% 1 859 1.47%
IRL 1 456 0.62% 8 873 3.75%
ITA 7 430 0.38% 30 194 1.53%
LTU 83 0.18% 519 1.13%
LUX 69 0.11% 346 0.57%
LVA 35 0.12% 185 0.64%
MLT 8 0.08% 46 0.47%
NLD 1 862 0.22% 12 982 1.57%
POL 840 0.16% 4 135 0.81%
PRT 386 0.18% 1 561 0.73%
ROU 291 0.16% 1 309 0.70%
SVK 222 0.23% 932 0.96%
SVN 94 0.21% 421 0.93%
SWE 1 179 0.22% 6 259 1.17%
EU-28 45 124 0.26% 225 013 1.30%
USA 18 564 0.11% 137 268 0.79%
Note: See the Appendix for a list of the country name abbreviations.
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Table 3: Total gain in Employment from TTIP
Country
Shallow TTIP Deep TTIP
(jobs) (% of total EMP) (jobs) (% of total EMP)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
AUT 5 039 0.12% 23 598 0.55%
BEL 4 057 0.09% 25 683 0.57%
BGR 3 139 0.09% 12 895 0.38%
CYP 74 0.02% 363 0.11%
CZE 6 822 0.13% 30 333 0.59%
DEU 64 349 0.15% 289 791 0.69%
DNK 1 877 0.07% 9 831 0.36%
ESP 10 303 0.06% 46 588 0.27%
EST 388 0.06% 1 917 0.32%
FIN 1 927 0.08% 11 367 0.46%
FRA 19 460 0.07% 99 035 0.36%
GBR 22 647 0.07% 132 951 0.43%
GRC 714 0.02% 3 849 0.10%
HRV 1 379 0.09% 6 176 0.39%
HUN 5 594 0.13% 23 870 0.57%
IRL 3 524 0.18% 20 431 1.06%
ITA 44 478 0.20% 174 114 0.77%
LTU 808 0.06% 4 043 0.31%
LUX 125 0.04% 607 0.17%
LVA 34 0.01% 209 0.05%
MLT 37 0.03% 178 0.12%
NLD 6 230 0.07% 47 547 0.55%
POL 12 041 0.08% 55 978 0.36%
PRT 4 992 0.11% 16 660 0.38%
ROU 6 673 0.08% 26 169 0.30%
SVK 2 340 0.11% 9 712 0.44%
SVN 888 0.10% 3 877 0.42%
SWE 3 702 0.08% 19 677 0.44%
EU-28 233 638 0.11% 1 097 446 0.49%
USA 48 905 0.04% 347 164 0.30%
Note: See the Appendix for a list of the country name abbreviations.
Note: Employment data in Eurostat is missing for some sectors in the following countries: Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta and Sweden. Therefore, the presented employment results for these countries will
likely underestimate the true impact.
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Table 4: Sectors with highest potential gains from a deep TTIP
Country
Sector Nace Rev.2
Value Added (VA) Employment (EMP)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
AUT Machinery & Equipment C28 Machinery & Equipment C28
BEL Chemicals C20 Legal & Accounting M69-M70
BGR Textiles C13-C15 Crop & Animal production A01
CYP Water transport H50 Fishing A03
CZE Machinery & Equipment C28 Metal products C25
DEU Motor vehicles C29 Machinery & Equipment C28
DNK Pharmaceutical C21 Machinery & Equipment C28
ESP Chemicals C20 Crop & Animal production A01
EST Administrative & Support N Furniture C31-C32
FIN Machinery & Equipment C28 Machinery & Equipment C28
FRA Administrative & Support N Administrative & Support N
GBR Machinery & Equipment C28 Machinery & Equipment C28
GRC Wholesale trade G46 Crop & Animal production A01
HRV Metal products C25 Metal products C25
HUN Motor vehicles C29 Motor vehicles C29
IRL Food C10-C12 Food C10-C12
ITA Textiles C13-C15 Textiles C13-C15
LTU Petroleum products C19 Furniture C31-C32
LUX Wholesale trade G46 Administrative & Support N
LVA Food C10-C12 Administrative & Support N
MLT Administrative & Support N Administrative & Support N
NLD Administrative & Support N Administrative & Support N
POL Wholesale trade G46 Crop & Animal production A01
PRT Textiles C13-C15 Textiles C13-C15
ROU Machinery & Equipment C28 Textiles C13-C15
SVK Motor vehicles C29 Metal products C25
SVN Metal products C25 Metal products C25
SWE Machinery & Equipment C28 Machinery & Equipment C28
EU-28 Machinery & Equipment C28 Machinery & Equipment C28
USA Chemicals C20 Administrative & Support N
Note: See the Appendix for a list of the country name abbreviations and sector codes.
Note: Which sector gains most depends on whether we express gains in terms of value added or employment. The
reason is that the value added contribution per worker can differ dramatically across sectors. Given that we
express the gains in absolute numbers, this means that the same increase in value added might lead to different
employment effects in different sectors.
Note: Employment data in Eurostat is missing for some sectors in the following countries: Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta and Sweden.
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Table 5: Trade and employment elasticity for manufacturing and services sectors
Trade
elasticity
Employment
elasticitySector
Manufacturing
Live Animals (A01) -4.0 0.57
Forestry (A02) -4.0 0.57
Fishing (A03) -4.0 0.57
Mining and Quarrying (B) -4.0 0.57
Food Product (C10-C12) -6.3 0.57
Textiles (C13-C15) -11.9 0.57
Wood and Cork (C16) -5.0 0.57
Paper Products (C17) -4.9 0.57
Printing and Media (C18) -5.1 0.57
Petroleum Products (C19) -7.8 0.57
Chemicals (C20) -5.7 0.57
Pharmaceutical (C21) -5.7 0.57
Rubber and Plastic (C22) -5.1 0.57
Other Non-Metallic (C23) -4.9 0.57
Basic Metals (C24) -6.1 0.57
Metal pProducts (C25) -8.1 0.57
Electronics & Computers (C26) -11.3 0.57
Electrical Equipment (C27) -4.0 0.57
Machinery & Equipment (C28) -9.9 0.57
Motor Vehicles (C29) -4.0 0.57
Transport Equipment (C30) -4.0 0.57
Furniture (C31-C32) -7.4 0.57
Repair of Machinery (C33) -12.8 0.57
Services -4.0 0.33
Note: Trade elasticities for manufacturing sectors were obtained from Imbs and Me´jean [2017]. To the
manufacturing sectors not reported in Imbs and Me´jean [2017], we assign a trade elasticity of −4 which is
a lower-end estimate of the trade elasticities reported in earlier literature. Since there are no reliable trade
elasticity estimates available for the non-manufacturing (services) sectors, we assign the same lower bound
trade elasticity of −4 to these sectors, see the last row in the table. The employment elasticity is derived
from Konings and Murphy [2006] and equals 0.57 for goods and 0.33 for services.
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Table 6: Share of indirect in total impact of deep TTIP in metal and motor vehicles sector
Share of indirect impact
Country Basic Metals Motor Vehicles
AUT 67% 27%
BEL 74% 26%
BGR 87% 52%
CYP 100% 94%
CZE 63% 79%
DEU 68% 8%
DNK 81% 55%
ESP 80% 27%
EST 58% 67%
FIN 62% 29%
FRA 70% 59%
GBR 36% 11%
GRC 62% 42%
HRV 65% 62%
HUN 84% 36%
IRL 80% 70%
ITA 66% 22%
LTU 92% 97%
LUX 59% 73%
LVA 92% 87%
MLT 92% 51%
NLD 63% 56%
POL 91% 80%
PRT 79% 58%
ROU 66% 65%
SVK 90% 37%
SVN 75% 71%
SWE 57% 26%
USA 72% 24%
Note: See the Appendix for a list of the country name abbreviations.
Note: the indirect impact in a country-sector is computed as the share of the value added production gain
that is due to an increase in exports of other domestic or foreign sectors after a deep TTIP agreement.
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Appendix
Table 7: Countries and ISO-3 Codes
Country Name Code (ISO-3) Country Name Code (ISO-3)
Austria AUT Hungary HUN
Belgium BEL Ireland IRL
Bulgaria BGR Italy ITA
Cyprus CYP Lithuania LTU
Czech Republic CZE Luxembourg LUX
Germany DEU Latvia LVA
Denmark DNK Malta MLT
Spain ESP Netherlands NLD
Estonia EST Poland POL
Finland FIN Portugal PRT
France FRA Romania ROU
United Kingdom GBR Slovakia SVK
Greece GRC Slovenia SVN
Croatia HRV Sweden SWE
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Table 8: Nace Rev. 2 Codes & Labels
Goods Services
Nace Rev.2 Sector Legend (Short) Nace Rev.2 Sector Legend (Short)
A01 Live Animals F Construction
A02 Forestry G45 Wholesale and retail trade
A03 Fishing G46 Wholesale trade
B Mining and quarrying G47 Retail trade
C10-C12 Food Product H49 Land & Pipeline transport
C13-C15 Textiles H50 Water transport
C16 Wood and Cork H51 Air transport
C17 Paper Products H52 Warehousing
C18 Printing and Media H53 Postal
C19 Petroleum Products I Accommodation & Food serv.
C20 Chemicals J58 Publishing Act.
C21 Pharmaceutical J59 J60 Media Production
C22 Rubber and Plastic J61 Telecom
C23 Other Non-metallic mineral J62 J63 Computer Programming, consultancy
C24 Basic Metals K64 Financial Services
C25 Metal products K65 Insurance
C26 Electronics and Computers K66 Auxiliary Financial Serv.
C27 Electrical Equipment L68 Real Estate
C28 Machinery & Equipment M69 M70 Legal and Accounting
C29 Motor vehicles M71 Architectural and engineering act.
C30 Transport equipment M72 Scientific Research
C31 C32 Furniture & other manufac. M73 Advertising and market research
C33 Installation of machinery M74 M75 Other professional activities
D35 Electricity & Gas N Administrative and support act.
E36 Water Collection Activities O84 Public admin and defence
E37-E39 Waste Collection Activities P85 Education
Q Health
R S Other services
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